Classical Homomorphic Encryption for Quantum Circuits by Mahadev, Urmila
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
02
13
0v
4 
 [
qu
an
t-
ph
] 
 1
2 
Se
p 
20
18
Classical Homomorphic Encryption for Quantum Circuits
Urmila Mahadev∗
September 14, 2018
Abstract
We present the first leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme for quantum circuits with classical keys.
The scheme allows a classical client to blindly delegate a quantum computation to a quantum server: an hon-
est server is able to run the computation while a malicious server is unable to learn any information about the
computation. We show that it is possible to construct such a scheme directly from a quantum secure classi-
cal homomorphic encryption scheme with certain properties. Finally, we show that a classical homomorphic
encryption scheme with the required properties can be constructed from the learning with errors problem.
1 Introduction
Can a classical client delegate a desired quantum computation to a remote quantum server while hiding all data
from the server? Quantum secure classical encryption schemes do not immediately answer this question; they
provide a way of hiding data, but not of computing on the data. This question is particularly relevant to proposals
for quantum computing in the cloud.
The classical analogue of this task, in which the client is a weak classical machine and the server is more pow-
erful (but still classical), was solved in 2009 with the celebrated construction of homomorphic encryption schemes
([Gen09]). Unfortunately, these schemes are built only to handle classical computations on the encrypted data;
the prospect of applying computations in superposition over encrypted bits seems to be much more difficult. This
difficulty arises from the fact that all classical homomorphic encryption schemes require (for security) that each bit
has many possible different encryptions. This property appears to preclude the quantum property of interference:
interference requires that elements of a superposition representing the same bit string, but with opposite amplitudes,
cancel out. If these elements have different encryptions, interference cannot happen, thereby preventing one of the
key advantages of quantum algorithms.
Due to these obstacles, the question of quantum homomorphic encryption was weakened by allowing a quantum
client ([BJ15]). This variant has been well studied in recent years ([BJ15], [OTF15], [TKO+16], [LC17], [NS17],
[DSS16]) and has led to advancements in the field of delegated quantum computing. However, the model has a
number of shortcomings. The principal issue is that the quantum client relies on quantum evaluation keys, which
are not reusable; the client must generate fresh keys each time he wishes to delegate a quantum computation.
Unfortunately, existing protocols ([DSS16]) require the client to generate a number of quantum keys proportional
to the size of the quantum circuit being applied.1
The related question of blind quantum computation predated the question of quantum homomorphic encryption
and has also been extensively studied, beginning with [Chi05]. Blind quantum computation and quantum homo-
morphic encryption have the same goal of carrying out a computation on encrypted data, but blind computation
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1The client is still restricted in some sense (in comparison to the server); for example, the client may not need to run a general BQP
circuit or may only require a constant sized quantum register.
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allows multiple rounds of interaction between the client and server, while homomorphic encryption allows only
one round of interaction. Even in the weaker model of blind computation, a quantum client has been a necessity so
far (at a minimum, the client must be able to prepare certain constant qubit states [BFK08]/[ABOE08]).
In this paper, we return to the original question of quantum homomorphic encryption by providing a homomor-
phic encryption scheme for quantum computations with a classical client. To do this, we show that certain classical
homomorphic encryption schemes can be lifted to the quantum setting; they can be used in a different way to allow
for homomorphic evaluation of quantum circuits. It follows that all properties of classical homomorphic encryption
schemes (such as reusability of keys and circular security) also hold in the quantum setting. This scheme is the first
(and currently only) to allow blind quantum computation between a classical client and a quantum server.2
To build our homomorphic encryption scheme, we begin with the fact that blindly computing a quantum circuit
can be reduced to the ability of a quantum server to perform a CNOT gate (a reversible XOR gate) controlled by
classically encrypted data. More specifically, we need a procedure which takes as input the classical encryption of
a bit s, which we denote as Enc(s), a 2 qubit state |ψ〉 = ∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab |a, b〉 and outputs the following state:
CNOTs |ψ〉 =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab |a, b⊕ a · s〉 (1)
We call this procedure an encrypted CNOT operation. Of course, the output state CNOTs |ψ〉 will have to be suit-
ably encrypted (to avoid revealing s); we will show in a bit that the Pauli one time pad encryption scheme suffices
for this purpose. The key step of the encrypted CNOT operation is the extraction of a classically encrypted bit into
a quantum superposition. We now show how this extraction can be done by relying on the classical cryptographic
primitive of trapdoor claw-free function pairs.
A trapdoor claw-free function pair is a pair of injective functions f0, f1 which have the same image, are easy to
invert with access to a trapdoor, and for which it is computationally difficult to find any pair of preimages (x0, x1)
with the same image (f0(x0) = f1(x1)). Such a pair of preimages is called a claw, hence the name claw-free. These
functions are particularly useful in the quantum setting, due to the fact that a quantum machine can create a uniform
superposition over a random claw (x0, x1):
1√
2
(|x0〉+ |x1〉). This superposition can be used to obtain information
which is conjectured to be hard to obtain classically: the quantum machine can obtain either a string d 6= 0 such
that d · (x0⊕x1) = 0 or one of the two preimages x0, x1. In [BCM+18], this advantage was introduced and used to
create a scheme for verifiable quantum supremacy and to show how to generate information theoretic randomness
from a single quantum device. This advantage was further used in [Mah18] to classically verify general quantum
computations.
Here, we show that if a bit s is encrypted using a trapdoor claw-free function pair f0, f1 : {0, 1} × R → Y , it
can easily be stored in superposition, as required for the encrypted CNOT operation. First, we need to be precise
about the encryption: we say that the function pair f0, f1 encrypts the bit s if each claw (µ0, r0), (µ1, r1) (for
µ0, µ1 ∈ {0, 1}, r0, r1 ∈ R) hides the bit s as follows: µ0 ⊕ µ1 = s. Before proceeding, we make a simplifying
assumption for the purposes of this introduction: we assume that the second qubit of the state |ψ〉 is fixed to 0
(in other words, |ψ〉 can be written as ∑a∈{0,1} αa |a, 0〉). This assumption allows us to highlight the key step of
the encrypted CNOT operation, which is the extraction of an encrypted bit into a superposition, and allows us to
replace (1) with:
CNOTs |ψ〉 =
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa |a, a · s〉 (2)
2There have been two papers ([MDMF17], [CCKW18]) proposing delegated blind quantum computation protocols between a classical
client and a quantum server. Both of these results differ from ours in that they do not claim security (i.e. blindness) against a malicious
quantum server for the delegation of general quantum computations. Moreover, both results require multiple rounds of interaction between
the client and the server.
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Given the special form of the trapdoor claw-free encryption, conversion to a superposition is quite straightforward.
Using the encryption f0, f1, the prover can entangle the state |ψ〉 with a random claw, creating the following state:
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa |a〉 |µa, ra〉 =
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa |a〉 |µ0 ⊕ a · s, ra〉 (3)
Observe that the bit s is now stored in superposition, although it is hidden (due to µ0, r0, r1). As mentioned earlier,
the output of the encrypted CNOT operation must be suitably encrypted, and µ0, r0, r1 will eventually be part of
this encryption, as we will see shortly. To briefly give some intuition about these parameters, note that µ0 serves as
a classical one time pad to hide the bit s, and r0, r1 are required since the bit s is in superposition; therefore, just a
classical one time pad does not suffice.
We now return to the encryption scheme we will use: as in previous blind quantum computation schemes,
our homomorphic encryption scheme relies on the Pauli one time pad encryption scheme for quantum states
([AMTdW00]), which is the quantum analogue of the classical one time pad. Recall the one time pad method
of classical encryption: to encrypt a string m, it is XORed with a random string r. Just as l classical bits suffice to
hide an l bit string m, 2l classical bits suffice to hide an l bit quantum state |ψ〉. The Pauli one time pad requires
the Pauli X and Z operators, defined as follows:
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
(4)
A single qubit state |ψ〉 is information theoretically encrypted by choosing bits z, x ∈ {0, 1} (called the Pauli keys)
at random and applying the Pauli one time pad ZzXx, creating the following encryption:
ZzXx |ψ〉 (5)
To convert this encryption to a computationally secure encryption, the encrypted Pauli keys are included as part of
the encryption (the resulting encryption is two part, consisting of the quantum state in (5) and classically encrypted
bits Enc(z),Enc(x)).
Given the Pauli one time pad, we can now precisely state the goal of our encrypted CNOT operation described
above. The encrypted CNOT operation is a quantum operation which takes as input Enc(s) and a 2 qubit state |ψ〉
and outputs the state ZzXxCNOTs |ψ〉 as well as classical encryptions of z, x ∈ {0, 1}2.3 Recall the final state of
the encrypted CNOT operation (as given in (3)):
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa |a〉 |µ0 ⊕ a · s, ra〉 = (I ⊗Xµ0 ⊗ I)
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa |a〉 |a · s, ra〉 (6)
The result of performing a Hadamard measurement on the final register (containing ra) to obtain a string d is:
(Zd·(r0⊕r1) ⊗Xµ0)
∑
a∈{0,1}
αa |a〉 |a · s〉 (7)
To complete the operation, the server must compute the encryptions of d · (r0 ⊕ r1) and µ0. This can be done via
a classical homomorphic computation as long as the server is given the encryption of the trapdoor of the function
pair f0, f1.
So far, we have shown that if Enc(s) is equal to a pair of trapdoor claw-free functions f0, f1 (for which each claw
hides the bit s), the encrypted CNOT operation is straightforward. However, in order to apply quantum operations
homomorphically to the Pauli one time pad encryption scheme described above, we require that Enc(s) is an
3Each application of the encrypted CNOT operation results in z, x ∈ {0, 1}2 sampled uniformly at random.
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encryption under a classical homomorphic encryption scheme. Therefore, to obtain a homomorphic encryption
scheme for quantum circuits, the above idea must be generalized: we must show how to perform the encrypted
CNOT operation if Enc(s) is a ciphertext of a classical homomorphic encryption scheme which may not have
the trapdoor claw-free structure described in the previous paragraph. We do so by showing that if the classical
encryption scheme satisfies certain properties, the function pair f0, f1 can be constructed given Enc(s). We call
such classical encryption schemes quantum capable. The two main results of this paper are that a quantum capable
scheme can be constructed from the learning with errors problem by combining two existing classical encryption
schemes (Theorem 5.2) and that quantum capable schemes can be used for homomorphic evaluation of quantum
circuits (Theorem 6.2). Combined, they provide the following theorem:
Theorem 1.1 (Informal) Under the assumption that the learning with errors problem with superpolynomial noise
ratio is computationally intractable for an efficient quantum machine, there exists a quantum leveled fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme with classical keys.
2 Overview
We now present an overview of the paper, which proceeds as follows. We first describe the Pauli one time pad
encryption scheme and show how quantum gates can be applied homomorphically, with the goal of reducing quan-
tum homomorphic encryption to the encrypted CNOT operation described in the introduction. We then describe
how the encrypted CNOT operation works, in the case that Enc(s) is equal to a trapdoor claw-free function pair
f0, f1 which hides the encrypted bit s. Next, we show how a classical encryption of a bit s can be used to build
f0, f1 if the encryption scheme has certain properties and we use these properties to describe how such quantum
capable homomorphic encryption schemes are defined. We conclude by describing how to combine two existing
classical homomorphic encryption schemes ([GPV07], [GSW13]) to form a quantum capable scheme, and then
showing how a quantum capable scheme can be used to build a quantum leveled fully homomorphic encryption
scheme with classical keys. The paper itself follows the outline of this overview and provides full proofs of all of
our results.
2.1 Reduction to the Encrypted CNOT Operation
An l qubit quantum state |ψ〉 is Pauli one time padded by choosing z, x ∈ {0, 1}l at random and applying ZzXx to
|ψ〉, creating ZzXx |ψ〉. The bit strings z, x are called the Pauli keys and are retained by the client. Once the client
sends the encrypted state to the server, the shared state held by the client and server is (the last register containing
zx is held by the client):
1
22l
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
ZzXx |ψ〉 〈ψ| (ZzXx)† ⊗ |zx〉 〈zx| (8)
The client’s decoding process is simple: he simply uses the keys z, x to apply the Pauli operator (ZzXx)† to the
state he receives from the server. A nice property is that, in the case that |ψ〉 is a standard basis state |m〉, the
quantum one time pad is the same as the classical one time pad:
ZzXx |m〉 〈m|XxZz = |m⊕ x〉 〈m⊕ x| (9)
It follows that the encoding and decoding of a standard basis state can be performed classically.
The key property of the Pauli one time pad used in blind computing is the fact that it can be used hide a quantum
state entirely: to the server, who has no knowledge of the Pauli keys, a Pauli one time padded quantum state is equal
to the maximally mixed state (the identity I), as stated in the following lemma (see Section 3.3.3 for the proof):
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Lemma 2.1 (Pauli Mixing) For a matrix ρ on two spaces A,B
1
22l
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
(ZzXx ⊗ IB)ρ(ZzXx ⊗ IB)† =
1
2l
IA ⊗ TrA(ρ)
The information theoretically secure Pauli one time pad encryption scheme can be easily transformed into a
computationally secure encryption scheme ([BJ15]). To do so, the client simply encrypts his classical Pauli keys
(z, x) (using a classical homomorphic encryption scheme) and includes the encryption Enc(z, x) as part of the
encryption of the state |ψ〉; the encryption is now a two part encryption, containing classically encrypted keys and
the Pauli one time padded quantum state ZzXx |ψ〉. To decode, the client requests both the Pauli key encryptions
and the quantum state. He first decrypts the Pauli key encryptions to obtain the Pauli keys, and then applies the
inverse of the Pauli keys to the quantum state.
2.1.1 Homomorphic Gate Application
In order to apply quantum gates homomorphically to the computationally secure Pauli encryption scheme, the
server will need to run two separate computations: a classical homomorphic computation on the Pauli keys and a
quantum computation on the one time padded state. In this section, we show how the server is able to perform the
following transformations for all gates V in a universal set of gates (our universal set will be the Clifford group
along with the Toffoli gate):
Enc(z, x)→ Enc(z′, x′) (10)
ZzXx |ψ〉 → Zz′Xx′V |ψ〉 (11)
Homomorphic Application of Pauli and Clifford Gates To achieve our goal, we simply need to show that the
transformations in (10)/(11) can be computed if V is a Clifford gate or a Toffoli gate. To provide intuition, we
also include the case in which V is a Pauli gate ZaXb. In this case, the server only performs the classical part of
the parallel computation (in (10)): he homomorphically updates his Pauli keys from Enc(z, x) to Enc(z′, x′), for
(z′ = z ⊕ a, x′ = x⊕ b). The server has now effectively applied ZaXb to his one time padded state, since
ZzXx |ψ〉 = Zz′⊕aXx′⊕b |ψ〉 = Zz′Xx′ZaXb |ψ〉 (12)
The equality follows up to a global phase since Pauli operators anti commute.
We continue to the case in which V is equal to a Clifford gate C . Clifford gates are applied by two parallel
computations: a homomorphic Pauli key update and a quantum operation on the one time padded state. The server
applies the gate C to his one time padded state, resulting in CZzXx |ψ〉. We now take advantage of the fact that
the Clifford group preserves the Pauli group by conjugation: for all z, x, there exist z′, x′ such that
CZzXx |ψ〉 = Zz′Xx′C |ψ〉 (13)
To complete the Clifford application, the server homomorphically updates his Pauli keys from Enc(z, x) to Enc(z′, x′).
Homomorphic Application of the Toffoli Gate The Toffoli gate is more complicated. It cannot be applied by
parallel quantum/classical operations by the server, as was done for Clifford gates. This is because it does not
preserve Pauli operators by conjugation; applying a Toffoli directly to a 3 qubit one time padded state yields:
TZzXx |ψ〉 = T (ZzXx)T †T |ψ〉 (14)
The correction T (ZzXx)T † is not a Pauli operator, as was the case for Clifford operators; it is instead a product of
Pauli and Clifford operators, where the Clifford operator involves Hadamard gates and gates of the form CNOTbzx
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(bzx is a bit which depends on the Pauli keys z, x). For the exact form of this operator, see Section 3.3.2. Since the
correction is a Clifford gate and not a Pauli gate, it cannot be removed by a simple homomorphic Pauli key update
by the server.
In order to complete the application of the Toffoli gate, the server will need to remove the operators CNOTbzx
up to Pauli operators. Since the server holds the encrypted Pauli keys, we can assume the server can compute an
encryption of bzx. Therefore, we have reduced the question of applying a Toffoli gate on top of a one time padded
state to the following question: can a BQP server use a ciphertext c encrypting a bit s to apply CNOTs to a quantum
state (up to Pauli operators)? In our setting specifically, s will be a function of the Pauli keys of the one time padded
state.
2.2 Encrypted CNOT Operation
We now present the key idea in this paper: we show how a BQP server can apply CNOTs if he holds a ciphertext
c encrypting a bit s. We call this procedure an encrypted CNOT operation. We first show how to perform this
operation in an ideal scenario in which the ciphertext c is a trapdoor claw-free function pair hiding the bit s. We
then generalize to the case in which c is a ciphertext from a classical homomorphic encryption scheme which
satisfies certain properties, which we will describe as they are used.
In our ideal scenario, there exists finite sets R,Y and the ciphertext c is equal to a trapdoor claw-free function
pair f0, f1 : {0, 1} × R → Y with one additional property. As a reminder of trapdoor claw-free function pairs,
recall that both f0, f1 are injective and their images are equal. There also exists a trapdoor which allows for efficient
inversion of both functions. Note that we have introduced an extra bit in the domain; this bit of the preimage will
be used to hide the bit s. The property we require is as follows: for all µ0, µ1 ∈ {0, 1} and r0, r1 ∈ R for which
f0(µ0, r0) = f1(µ1, r1), µ0 ⊕ µ1 = s (s is the value encrypted in the ciphertext c).
Our encrypted CNOT operation boils down to the ability to extract an encrypted bit from a classical encryption
and instead store it in superposition in a quantum state. The claw-free function pair f0, f1 described above serves
as a classical encryption for the bit s which immediately allows this task. At a high level (we discuss the details
in the next paragraph), this is because it is possible for the server to compute the following superposition, for a
random claw (µ0, r0), (µ1, r1):
1√
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
|µb〉 |rb〉 (15)
Since µ0 ⊕ µ1 = s, the above state can be written as:
(Xµ0 ⊗ I) 1√
2
∑
b∈{0,1}
|b · s〉 |rb〉 (16)
Therefore, the server is able to easily convert a classical encryption of s (which is in the form a trapdoor claw-free
function pair) to a quantum superposition which contains s.
It is quite straightforward to use the above process to apply the encrypted CNOT operation: the superposition
over the claw in (15) is simply entangled with the first qubit of the quantum state on which the CNOT is to be
applied. We now describe this process in detail. Assume the server would like to apply CNOTs to a 2 qubit state
|ψ〉 = ∑a,b∈{0,1} αab |a, b〉. The server begins by entangling the first qubit of the state |ψ〉 with a random claw of
f0, f1, which proceeds as follows. The server uses the first qubit of |ψ〉 to choose between the functions f0, f1 in
order to create the following superposition:
1√
2|R|
∑
a,b,µ∈{0,1},r∈R
αab |a, b〉 |µ, r〉 |fa(µ, r)〉 (17)
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Now the server measures the final register to obtain y ∈ Y . Let (µ0, r0), (µ1, r1) be the two preimages of y
(f0(µ0, r0) = f1(µ1, r1) = y). The remaining state is:
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab |a, b〉 |µa〉 |ra〉 (18)
Recall that to apply CNOTs, the value a · smust be added to the register containing b. This is where the structure in
(16) (which relies on the fact that µ0 ⊕ µ1 = s) comes in to play: to add a · s, the server XORs µa into the second
register, which essentially applies the operation CNOTs:
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab |a, b⊕ µa〉 |µa〉 |ra〉 =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab(I ⊗Xµ0)CNOTs1,2 |a, b〉 ⊗ |µa, ra〉 (19)
Finally, the server applies a Hadamard transform on the registers containing µa, ra and measures to obtain d. If we
let (µa, ra) denote the concatenation of the two values, the resulting state (up to a global phase) is
(Zd·((µ0,r0)⊕(µ1,r1)) ⊗Xµ0)CNOTs1,2
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab |a, b〉 (20)
In order to complete the encrypted CNOT operation, the server requires an encryption of the trapdoor of the func-
tions f0, f1. The server can then homomorphically compute the bits µ0 and d · ((µ0, r0) ⊕ (µ1, r1)) and use these
bits to update his Pauli keys.
2.2.1 Trapdoor Claw-free Pair Construction
So far, we have shown how to apply the encrypted CNOT operation in the case that the ciphertext c encrypting the
bit s is a trapdoor claw-free function pair f0, f1 which hides s. To build a homomorphic encryption scheme, we
need to show how the encrypted CNOT operation can be applied if c instead comes from a classical homomorphic
encryption scheme, which we call HE. We now show that if HE satisfies certain properties, the function pair f0, f1
hiding the bit s can be constructed (by the server) using c.
The function f0 will be the encryption function of HE. The function f1 is the function f0 shifted by the homo-
morphic XOR of the ciphertext c encrypting the bit s: f0 = f1⊕H c (⊕H is the homomorphic XOR operation). To
ensure that f0, f1 are injective, we require that HE has the property of randomness recoverability: there must exist
a trapdoor which allows recovery of µ0, r0 from a ciphertext Enc(µ0; r0) (Enc(µ0; r0) denotes the encryption of a
bit µ0 with randomness r0). We also require that the homomorphic XOR operation is efficiently invertible using
only the public key of HE.
Unfortunately, the images of the functions f0, f1 are not equal. We will instead require the weaker (but still
sufficient) condition that there exists a distribution D over the domain of the functions such that f0(D) and f1(D)
are statistically close. We replace (17) with the corresponding weighted superposition:
∑
a,b,µ∈{0,1},r
αab
√
D(µ, r) |a〉 |b〉 |µ, r〉 |fa(µ, r)〉 (21)
To do so, we require that the server can efficiently create the following superposition:
∑
µ∈{0,1},r
√
D(µ, r) |µ, r〉 (22)
Due to the negligible statistical distance between f0(D) and f1(D), when the last register of (21) is measured to
obtain y, with high probability there exist µ0, r0, µ1, r1 such that y = f0(µ0, r0) = f1(µ1, r1), which implies that
the state collapses to (18) and that
Enc(µ0; r0) = Enc(µ1; r1)⊕H c (23)
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Since ⊕H is the homomorphic XOR operation, µ0 ⊕ µ1 = s.
There is one remaining issue with the encrypted CNOT operation described above. The requirements above
must hold for a classical ciphertext c which occurs at any point during the classical computation on the encrypted
Pauli keys. However, in many classical homomorphic encryption schemes, the format of the ciphertext c changes
throughout the computation. We know of several schemes for which the above requirements hold for a freshly
encrypted ciphertext, but we do not know of any schemes which satisfy the requirements during a later stage of
computation. The next section addresses this complication by sufficiently weakening the above requirements while
preserving the functionality of the encrypted CNOT operation.
2.3 Quantum Capable Classical Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
In this section, we define quantum capable homomorphic encryption schemes, i.e. classical leveled fully homo-
morphic encryption schemes which can be used to evaluate quantum circuits. To justify why we must weaken
the requirements listed in Section 2.2, we begin with a description of the ideal high level structure of a quantum
capable homomorphic encryption scheme. In many classical homomorphic encryption schemes, the encryption of
a bit b can be thought of as a random element of a subset Sb, perturbed by some noise term ǫ. As the computation
progresses, we will require that the structure of the ciphertext remains the same; it must still be a random element
of Sb, but the noise term may grow throughout the computation. We will also require that the homomorphic XOR
operation is natural, in the sense that the noise of the output ciphertext is simply the addition of the two noise terms
of the input ciphertexts. If these two conditions hold (invariance of the ciphertext form and the existence of a nat-
ural XOR operation), deriving a distribution f0(D) over ciphertexts which remains roughly the same after shifting
by the homomorphic XOR of the ciphertext c (as needed in Section 2.2) is straightforward. We simply choose D
to sample the noise term from a discrete Gaussian distribution with width sufficiently larger than the magnitude of
the noise term of the ciphertext c.
Unfortunately, we do not know of a classical homomorphic encryption scheme which satisfies both the con-
ditions (ciphertext form and natural XOR operation) at once. To account for this difficulty, we define a quantum
capable homomorphic encryption schemes as follows. We call a classical homomorphic encryption scheme HE
quantum capable if there exists an alternative encryption scheme AltHE which satisfies the following conditions.
First, given a ciphertext c under HE, it must be possible for the server to convert c to a ciphertext ĉ under AltHE.
The conversion process must maintain the decrypted value of the ciphertext. Second, AltHE must have a natural
homomorphic XOR operation (which is also efficiently invertible). Third, there must exist a distribution f0(D)
over encryptions under AltHE which must remain almost the same after shifting by the homomorphic XOR of ĉ
and must allow efficient construction of the superposition in (22). In addition, it must be possible to both decrypt
and recover randomness from ciphertexts under AltHE given the appropriate secret key and trapdoor information.
This definition is formalized in Section 4.
Finally, we describe how to connect this weaker definition to the encrypted CNOT operation given in Section
2.2. We begin with a quantum capable homomorphic encryption scheme HE, which is used to encrypt the Pauli
keys. HE satisfies the ciphertext form requirement but may not have a natural XOR operation. Each time the
server needs to apply an encrypted CNOT operation (controlled by a ciphertext c encrypting a bit s under HE),
he will convert c to a ciphertext ĉ under AltHE, which does have a natural XOR operation. Using AltHE (rather
than HE) the server performs the operations described in Section 2.2. Upon obtaining his measurement results
(denoted as y and d), the server will encrypt both ĉ and y, d under HE. The server will then use the secret key
and trapdoor information of AltHE, which are provided to him as encryptions under HE, to homomorphically
recover the randomness and decrypted values from both y and ĉ. This encrypted information can be used to
homomorphically compute the Pauli key updates. The entire classical homomorphic computation is done under
HE.
8
2.4 Example of a Quantum Capable Classical Encryption Scheme
In Section 5 (Theorem 5.2), we show that an existing classical fully homomorphic encryption scheme is quantum
capable. We use the structure of the scheme from [GSW13], which is a leveled fully homomorphic encryption
scheme built by extending the vector ciphertexts of [Reg05] to matrices. The resulting encryption scheme does
satisfy the ciphertext form requirement (as described in Section 2.3), but since the underlying encryption scheme
([Reg05]) does not have the randomness recoverability property, neither does [GSW13]. We therefore alter the
scheme from [GSW13] to use the dual encryption scheme of [Reg05], which was introduced in [GPV07] and
allows randomness recovery, as the underlying encryption scheme. We call the resulting scheme DualHE and the
underlying scheme of [GPV07] Dual.
We use the scheme DualHE as an instantiation of the scheme we called HE in Section 2.3. Although the
underlying scheme Dual does have a natural XOR operation, the extension to matrices compromises the XOR
operation; once the ciphertexts are matrices, addition is performed over a larger field. Luckily, it is easy to convert
a ciphertext of DualHE to a ciphertext of Dual. We therefore use Dual as AltHE.
In Section 5, we first describe the scheme Dual from [GPV07] and we then show how to extend it to DualHE
using [GSW13]. Next, we show that DualHE satisfies the ciphertext form requirement and that a ciphertext under
DualHE can be converted to a ciphertext under Dual. In Theorem 5.1, we use these properties to show that DualHE
is a classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Finally, we show in Theorem 5.2 that DualHE is
quantum capable with only a small modification of parameters (the underlying assumption for both the classical
FHE and the quantum capable instantiation is the hardness of learning with errors with a superpolynomial noise
ratio).
2.5 Extension to Quantum Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption
We have so far provided a quantum fully homomorphic encryption scheme with classical keys under the assumption
of circular security: the server must be provided the encrypted secret key and trapdoor information in order to
update his encrypted Pauli keys after each encrypted CNOT operation. Our notion of circular security here will be
slightly stronger than the standard notion, due to the encryption of the trapdoor (instead of just the secret key). As
an alternative to assuming circular security, we can build a quantum leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme
by employing a technique which is commonly used in classical homomorphic encryption schemes (Section 4.1 in
[Gen09]): we will encrypt the secret key and trapdoor information under a fresh public key. In other words, the
ith level secret key ski and its corresponding trapdoor information are encrypted under a fresh public key pki+1
and given to the server as part of the evaluation key. The computation of the Pauli key updates corresponding
to the encrypted CNOT operations of level i is performed under pki+1 (i.e. the corresponding ĉ, y and d from
each encrypted CNOT operation in level i will be encrypted, by the server, under pki+1 - see the last paragraph of
Section 2.3).
Note that with the introduction of the leveled scheme, we can see the classical portion of the quantum homo-
morphic computation as follows. Each level of the quantum computation can be thought of as a series of Clifford
gates followed by one layer of non intersecting Toffoli gates, finishing with a layer of non intersecting encrypted
CNOT operations. It follows that the classical homomorphic computation of level i consists of first decrypting and
recovering randomness from the cipertexts corresponding to the encrypted CNOT operations from level i− 1, then
performing the Pauli key updates corresponding to the encrypted CNOT operations from level i − 1 and finally
performing the Pauli key updates corresponding to the Clifford and Toffoli gates of level i. The ciphertexts which
result from this computation are then used as the control bits for the layer of encrypted CNOT operations of level i.
Intuitively, this leveled approach is secure since each secret key is protected by the semantic security of the
encryption scheme under an independent public key. To prove security, we start with the final level of encryption.
If there are L levels of the circuit, then there will be no trapdoor or secret key information provided corresponding
to pkL+1. It follows that all encryptions under pkL+1 can be replaced by encryptions of 0; now there is no encrypted
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information provided corresponding to skL. Then all encryptions under pkL can be replaced by encryptions of 0,
and we can continue in this manner until we reach pk1, which will imply security of encryptions under the initial
public key pk1. The scheme and proof of security are presented in Section 6, proving that quantum capable classical
encryption schemes can be used to build a quantum leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme (see Theorem
6.2 for a formal statement).
2.6 Paper Outline
We begin with preliminaries in Section 3. In Section 4, we define quantum capable encryption schemes by listing
the requirements that a classical homomorphic encryption scheme must satisfy in order to be used to evaluate
quantum circuits, as described in Section 2.3. We use this definition to formally prove the correctness (in Claim
4.3) of the encrypted CNOT operation given in Section 2.2. Section 5 covers Section 2.4: we provide an example
of a classical homomorphic encryption scheme which is quantum capable. In Section 6, we formally show how
to extend a quantum capable classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme to a quantum leveled fully
homomorphic encryption scheme (as described in Section 2.5).
3 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we borrow notation and definitions from [ABOE08], [ABOEM17] and [BCM+18]. Parts
of the following sections are also taken from these sources.
3.1 Notation
For all q ∈ N we let Zq denote the ring of integers modulo q. We represent elements in Zq using numbers in the
range (− q2 ,
q
2 ] ∩ Z. We denote by [x]q the unique integer y s.t. y = x (mod q) and y ∈ (−
q
2 ,
q
2 ]. For x ∈ Zq we
define |x| = |[x]q|. For a vector u ∈ Znq , we write ‖u‖∞ ≤ β if each entry ui in u satisfies |ui| ≤ β. Similarly,
for a matrix U ∈ Zn×mq , we write ‖U‖∞ ≤ β if each entry ui,j in U satisfies |ui,j| ≤ β. When considering an
s ∈ {0, 1}n we sometimes also think of s as an element of Znq , in which case we write it as s.
We use the terminology of polynomially bounded, super-polynomial, and negligible functions. A function
n : N → R+ is polynomially bounded if there exists a polynomial p such that n(λ) ≤ p(λ) for all λ ∈ N. A
function n : N→ R+ is negligible (resp. super-polynomial) if for every polynomial p, p(λ)n(λ) →λ→∞ 0 (resp.
n(λ)/p(λ)→λ→∞ ∞).
We generally use the letter D to denote a distribution over a finite domain X, and f for a density on X, i.e. a
function f : X → [0, 1] such that
∑
x∈X f(x) = 1. We often use the distribution and its density interchangeably.
We write U for the uniform distribution. We write x ← D to indicate that x is sampled from distribution D, and
x ←U X to indicate that x is sampled uniformly from the set X. We write DX for the set of all densities on X.
For any f ∈ DX , SUPP(f) denotes the support of f ,
SUPP(f) =
{
x ∈ X | f(x) > 0
}
.
For two densities f1 and f2 over the same finite domain X, the Hellinger distance between f1 and f2 is
H2(f1, f2) = 1−
∑
x∈X
√
f1(x)f2(x) . (24)
and the total variation distance between f1 and f2 is:
‖f1 − f2‖TV =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|f1(x)− f2(x)| . (25)
The following lemma will be useful:
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Lemma 3.1 Let D0,D1 be distributions over a finite domain X. Let X
′ ⊆ X. Then:
∣∣∣ Pr
x←D0
[x ∈ X ′]− Pr
x←D1
[x ∈ X ′]
∣∣∣ ≤ ‖D0 −D1‖TV (26)
We require the following definition:
Definition 3.2 Computational Indistinguishability of Distributions Two families of distributions {D0,λ}λ∈N and
{D1,λ}λ∈N (indexed by the security parameter λ) are computationally indistinguishable if for all quantum polynomial-
time attackers A there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N
∣∣∣ Pr
x←D0,λ
[A(x) = 0]− Pr
x←D1,λ
[A(x) = 0]
∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) . (27)
3.2 Learning with Errors and Discrete Gaussians
This background section on the learning with errors problem is taken directly from [BCM+18]. For a positive real
B and positive integers q, the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Zq with parameter B is supported on
{x ∈ Zq : ‖x‖ ≤ B} and has density
D
Zq,B(x) =
e
−π‖x‖2
B2
∑
x∈Zq, ‖x‖≤B
e
−π‖x‖2
B2
. (28)
We note that for any B > 0, the truncated and non-truncated distributions have statistical distance that is exponen-
tially small in B [Ban93, Lemma 1.5]. For a positive integer m, the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over
Z
m
q with parameter B is supported on {x ∈ Zmq : ‖x‖ ≤ B
√
m} and has density
∀x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Zmq , DZmq ,B(x) = DZq ,B(x1) · · ·DZq,B(xm) . (29)
Lemma 3.3 Let B be a positive real number and q,m be positive integers. Let e ∈ Zmq . The Hellinger distance
between the distribution D = D
Z
m
q ,B and the shifted distribution D + e satisfies
H2(D,D + e) ≤ 1− e
−2π√m‖e‖
B , (30)
and the statistical distance between the two distributions satisfies
∥∥D − (D + e)
∥∥2
TV
≤ 2
(
1− e
−2π√m‖e‖
B
)
. (31)
Definition 3.4 For a security parameter λ, let n,m, q ∈ N be integer functions of λ. Letχ = χ(λ) be a distribution
over Z. The LWEn,m,q,χ problem is to distinguish between the distributions (A,As + e (mod q)) and (A,u),
where A is uniformly random in Zn×mq , s is a uniformly random row vector in Z
n
q , e is a row vector drawn at
random from the distribution χm, and u is a uniformly random vector in Zmq . Often we consider the hardness
of solving LWE for any function m such that m is at most a polynomial in n log q. This problem is denoted
LWEn,q,χ. When we write that we make the LWEn,q,χ assumption, our assumption is that no quantum polynomial-
time procedure can solve the LWEn,q,χ problem with more than a negligible advantage in λ.
As shown in [Reg05, PRS17], for any α > 0 such that σ = αq ≥ 2√n the LWEn,q,D
Zq,σ
problem, where
D
Zq ,σ is the discrete Gaussian distribution, is at least as hard as approximating the shortest independent vector
problem (SIVP) to within a factor of γ = Õ(n/α) in worst case dimension n lattices. This is proven using a
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quantum reduction. Classical reductions (to a slightly different problem) exist as well [Pei09, BLP+13] but with
somewhat worse parameters. The best known (classical or quantum) algorithm for these problems run in time
2Õ(n/ log γ). For our construction we assume hardness of the problem against a quantum polynomial-time adversary
in the case that γ is a super polynomial function in n. This is a commonly used assumption in cryptography (for
e.g. homomorphic encryption schemes such as [GSW13]).
We use two additional properties of the LWE problem. The first is that it is possible to generate LWE samples
(A,As + e) such that there is a trapdoor allowing recovery of s from the samples.
Theorem 3.5 (Theorem 5.1 in [MP11]) Let n,m ≥ 1 and q ≥ 2 be such that m = Ω(n log q). There is an
efficient randomized algorithm GENTRAP(1n, 1m, q) that returns a matrix A ∈ Zm×nq and a trapdoor tA such that
the distribution of A is negligibly (in n) close to the uniform distribution. Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm
INVERT that, on input A, tA and As+ e where ‖e‖ ≤ q/(CT
√
n log q) and CT is a universal constant, returns s
and e with overwhelming probability over (A, tA)← GENTRAP.
The second property is the existence of a “lossy mode” for LWE. The following definition is Definition 3.1
in [AKPW13].
Definition 3.6 Let χ = χ(λ) be an efficiently sampleable distribution over Zq. Define a lossy sampler Ã ←
LOSSY(1n, 1m, 1ℓ, q, χ) by Ã = BC+ F, where B←U Zm×ℓq , C←U Zℓ×nq , F← χm×n.
Theorem 3.7 (Lemma 3.2 in [AKPW13]) Under the LWEℓ,q,χ assumption, the distribution of Ã← LOSSY(1n, 1m, 1ℓ, q, χ)
is computationally indistinguishable from A←U Zm×nq .
3.3 Quantum Computation Preliminaries
3.3.1 Quantum Operations
We will use the X,Y and Z Pauli operators: X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
and Y = iXZ . The l-qubits
Pauli group consists of all elements of the form P = P1 ⊗ P2⊗. . .⊗Pl where Pi ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}, together with
the multiplicative factors −1 and ±i. We will use a subset of this group, which we denote as Pl, which includes
all operators P = P1 ⊗ P2⊗. . .⊗Pl but not the multiplicative factors. We will use the fact that Pauli operators
anti commute; ZX = −XZ . The Pauli group Pl is a basis to the matrices acting on l qubits. We can write any
matrix U over a vector space A⊗ B (where A is the space of l qubits) as ∑P∈Pl P ⊗ UP where UP is some (not
necessarily unitary) matrix on B.
Let Cl denote the l-qubit Clifford group. Recall that it is a finite subgroup of unitaries acting on l qubits
generated by the Hadamard matrix H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, by K =
(
1 0
0 i
)
, and by controlled-NOT (CNOT)
which maps |a, b〉 to |a, a⊕ b〉 (for bits a, b). The Clifford group is characterized by the property that it maps the
Pauli group Pl to itself, up to a phase α ∈ {±1,±i}. That is: ∀C ∈ Cl, P ∈ Pl : αCPC† ∈ Pl
The Toffoli gate T maps |a, b, c〉 to |a, b, c⊕ ab〉 (for a, b, c ∈ {0, 1}). We will use the fact that the set consisting
of the Toffoli gate and the Hadamard gate is a universal gate set for quantum circuits ([Shi03]).
3.3.2 Toffoli Gate Application
A Toffoli operator maps Pauli operators to Clifford operators in the following way:
TZz1Xx1 ⊗ Zz2Xx2 ⊗ Zz3Xx3T † = CNOT x21,3CNOT x12,3Ẑz31,2Zz1+x2z3Xx1 ⊗ Zz2+x1z3Xx2 ⊗ Zz3Xx1x2+x3
= CzxPzx (32)
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where Ẑ is the controlled phase gate:
Ẑ |a, b〉 = (−1)ab |a, b〉 (33)
Ẑz3 = (I ⊗H)CNOT z31,2(I ⊗H) (34)
Observe that Czx consists only of CNOT gates and 2 Hadamard gates. Only the CNOT gates are dependent on the
Pauli keys.
3.3.3 Pauli Mixing
Here we restate Lemma 2.1 and prove it:
Lemma 2.1 For a matrix ρ on two spaces A,B
1
22l
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
(ZzXx ⊗ IB)ρ(ZzXx ⊗ IB)† =
1
2l
IA ⊗ TrA(ρ)
Proof of Lemma 2.1 : First, we write ρ as:
∑
ij
|i〉 〈j|A ⊗ ρij
It follows that:
TrA(ρ) =
∑
i
ρii
Next, observe that:
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
ZzXx |i〉 〈j| (ZzXx)† =
∑
x∈{0,1}l
(
∑
z∈{0,1}l
(−1)z·(i⊕j))Xx |i〉 〈j| (Xx)† (35)
This expression is 0 if i 6= j. If i = j, we obtain 2lIA. Plugging in this observation to the expression in the claim,
we have:
1
22l
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
(ZzXx ⊗ IB)ρ(ZzXx ⊗ IB)† =
1
22l
∑
ij
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
ZzXx |i〉 〈j|A (ZzXx)† ⊗ ρij
=
1
22l
∑
i
∑
z,x∈{0,1}l
ZzXx |i〉 〈i|A (ZzXx)† ⊗ ρii
=
1
2l
IA ⊗ TrA(ρ) (36)

3.3.4 Trace Distance
For density matrices ρ, σ, the trace distance ‖ρ− σ‖tr is equal to:
‖ρ− σ‖tr =
1
2
Tr(
√
(ρ− σ)2) (37)
We will use the following fact ([Wik18]):
‖ρ− σ‖tr = max
P
Tr(P (ρ− σ)) (38)
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where the maximization is carried over all projectors P . We will also use the fact that the trace distance is con-
tractive under completely positive trace preserving maps ([Wik18]). The following lemma relates the Hellinger
distance as given in (24) and the trace distance of superpositions:
Lemma 3.8 Let X be a finite set and f1, f2 ∈ Dx. Let
|ψ1〉 =
∑
x∈X
√
f1(x) |x〉 and |ψ2〉 =
∑
x∈X
√
f2(x) |x〉 .
Then
‖|ψ1〉 〈ψ1| − |ψ2〉 〈ψ2|‖tr =
√
1− (1−H2(f1, f2))2 .
We require the following definition, which is analogous to Definition 3.2:
Definition 3.9 Computational Indistinguishability of Quantum States Two families of density matrices {ρ0,λ}λ∈N
and {ρ1,λ}λ∈N (indexed by the security parameter λ) are computationally indistinguishable if for all efficiently
computable CPTP maps S there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that for all λ ∈ N:
∣∣∣Tr((|0〉 〈0| ⊗ I)S(ρ0,λ − ρ1,λ)
∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) . (39)
3.4 Homomorphic Encryption
The following definitions are modified versions of definitions from [BV14] and [BV13]. A homomorphic (public-
key) encryption scheme HE = (HE.Keygen, HE.Enc, HE.Dec, HE.Eval) is a quadruple of PPT algoritms which
operate as follow:
• Key Generation. The algorithm (pk, evk, sk) ← HE.Keygen(1λ) takes a unary representation of the secu-
rity parameter and outputs a public key encryption key pk, a public evaluation key evk and a secret decryption
key sk.
• Encryption. The algorithm c ← HE.Encpk(µ) takes the public key pk and a single bit message µ ∈ {0, 1}
and outputs a ciphertext c. The notation HE.Encpk(µ; r) will be used to represent the encryption of a bit µ
using randomness r.
• Decryption. The algorithm µ∗ ← HE.Decsk(c) takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a
message µ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
• Homomorphic Evaluation The algorithm cf ← HE.Evalevk(f, c1, . . . , cl) takes the evaluation key evk, a
function f : {0, 1}l → {0, 1} and a set of l ciphertexts c1, . . . , cl, and outputs a ciphertext cf . It must be the
case that:
HE.Decsk(cf ) = f(HE.Decsk(c1), . . . ,HE.Decsk(cl)) (40)
with all but negligible probability in λ.
A homomorphic encryption scheme is said to be secure if it meets the following notion of semantic security:
Definition 3.10 (CPA Security) A scheme HE is IND-CPA secure if, for any polynomial time adversary A, there
exists a negligible function µ(·) such that
AdvCPA[A] def= |Pr[A(pk, evk,HE.Encpk(0)) = 1]− Pr[A(pk, evk,HE.Encpk(1)) = 1]| = µ(λ) (41)
where (pk, evk, sk)← HE.Keygen(1λ).
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We now define two desirable properties of homomorphic encryption schemes:
Definition 3.11 (Compactness and Full Homomorphism) A homomorphic encryption scheme HE is compact if
there exists a polynomial s in λ such that the output length of HE.Eval is at most s bits long (regardless of f or
the number of inputs). A compact scheme is (pure) fully homomorphic if it can evaluate any efficiently computable
boolean function. A compact scheme is leveled fully homomorphic if it takes 1L as additional input in key gener-
ation, and can only evaluate depth L Boolean circuits where L is polynomial in λ. A scheme is quantum pure or
leveled fully homomorphic if we refer to quantum circuits rather than boolean circuits.
4 Quantum Capable Classical Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
As described in Section 2.3, a classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme is quantum capable if an
encrypted CNOT operation can be applied with respect to any ciphertext which occurs during the computation. We
begin by formalizing the notion of such a ciphertext. This definition is dependent on the depth parameter L (see
Definition 3.11). Let FL be the set of all functions which can be computed by circuits of depth L. Assume for
convenience that all such functions have domain {0, 1}l and range {0, 1}.
Definition 4.1 For a classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme HE, let CHE be the set of all cipher-
texts which can occur during the computation:
CHE = {HE.Evalevk(f,HE.Encpk(µ1), . . . ,HE.Encpk(µl))|f ∈ FL, µ1, . . . µl ∈ {0, 1}} (42)
We now define quantum capable homomorphic encryption schemes:
Definition 4.2 (Quantum Capable Homomorphic Encryption Schemes) Let λ be the security parameter. Let
HE be a classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. HE is quantum capable if there exists an encryp-
tion scheme AltHE such that the following conditions hold for all ciphertexts c ∈ CHE.
1. There exists an algorithm HE.Convert which on input c produces an encryption ĉ under AltHE, where both c
and ĉ encrypt the same value.
2. AltHE allows the XOR operation to be performed homomorphically. Moreover, the XOR operation is effi-
ciently invertible using only the public key of AltHE.
3. There exists a distribution D which may depend on the parameters of HE and satisfies the following condi-
tions:
(a) The Hellinger distance between the following two distributions is negligible in λ:
{AltHE.Encpk(µ; r)|(µ, r) $←− D} (43)
and
{AltHE.Encpk(µ; r)⊕H ĉ|(µ, r) $←− D} (44)
where ⊕H represents the homomorphic XOR operation.
(b) It is possible for a BQP server to create the following superposition given access to the public key pk:
∑
µ∈{0,1},r
√
D(µ, r) |µ, r〉 (45)
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(c) Given y = AltHE.Encpk(µ0; r0) where (µ0, r0) is sampled from D, it must be possible to compute
µ0, r0 given the secret key and possibly additional trapdoor information (which can be computed as
part of the key generation procedure).
For convenience, we will assume that AltHE and HE have the same public/secret key; this is the case in the example
quantum capable scheme we provide in Section 5 and also simplifies Section 6. However, this assumption is not
necessary.
We prove the following claim, which formalizes the encrypted CNOT operation given in Section 2.2:
Claim 4.3 Let HE be a quantum capable homomorphic encryption scheme and let c ∈ CHE be a ciphertext en-
crypting a bit s. Consider a BQP machine with access to c and a state |ψ〉 on two qubits. The BQP machine
can compute a ciphertext y = AltHE.Encpk(µ0, r0), a string d and a state within negligible trace distance of the
following ideal state:
(Zd·((µ0,r0)⊕(µ1,r1)) ⊗Xµ0)CNOT s1,2 |ψ〉 (46)
for (⊕H is the homomorphic XOR operation)
AltHE.Encpk(µ0, r0) = AltHE.Encpk(µ1, r1)⊕H HE.Convert(c) (47)
Proof of Claim 4.3: The server first computes ĉ = HE.Convert(c). He then applies the encrypted CNOT opera-
tion, as described in Section 2.2. Recall that in Section 2.2, we used f0 to denote the encryption function of AltHE
and f1 to denote the shift of f0 by the homomorphic XOR (which we denote as ⊕H ) of ĉ. At the stage of (21), the
server holds the following state:
∑
a,b,µ∈{0,1},r
αab
√
D(µ, r) |a〉 |b〉 |µ, r〉 |fa(r)〉 (48)
=
∑
a,b,µ∈{0,1},r
αab
√
D(µ, r) |a〉 |b〉 |µ, r〉 |AltHE.Encpk(µ; r)⊕H a · ĉ〉 (49)
Fix a = 1 and b and consider the resulting state:
∑
µ0∈{0,1},r0
√
D(µ1, r1) |1, b〉 |µ1, r1〉 |AltHE.Encpk(µ0; r0)〉 (50)
where µ1, r1 are defined with respect to µ0, r0 and ĉ as in (47). We can now apply Lemma 3.8 with reference to the
distributions in (43) and (44), which are negligibly close. As a result, we obtain that the following state is within
negligible trace distance of (50):
∑
µ0∈{0,1},r0
√
D(µ0, r0) |1, b〉 |µ1, r1〉 |AltHE.Encpk(µ0; r0)〉 (51)
It follows immediately that the state in (49) is within negligible trace distance of the following state:
∑
µ0∈{0,1},r0
∑
a,b∈{0,1}
αab
√
D(µ0, r0) |a, b〉 |µa, ra〉 |AltHE.Encpk(µ0; r0)〉 (52)
Observe that, when measured, the state in (52) collapses exactly to the state in (18). The statement of Claim 4.3
follows.

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5 Example of a Quantum Capable Classical Encryption Scheme
This section is dedicated to showing that the dual of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme in [GSW13] is
quantum capable. We begin by presenting a scheme called Dual in Section 5.1, which is the dual of the encryption
scheme from [Reg05]. In Section 5.2, we use the framework of [GSW13] to extend Dual to a scheme called
DualHE, which we prove in Theorem 5.1 is a classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Finally, in
Section 5.3 (Theorem 5.2), we prove that DualHE is quantum capable .
We begin by listing our initial parameters. Let λ be the security parameter. All other parameters are functions
of λ. Let q ≥ 2 be a power of 2. Let n,m ≥ 1 be polynomially bounded functions of λ, let N = (m+1) log q and
let βinit be a positive integer such that the following conditions hold:
1. m = Ω(n log q) ,
2. 2
√
n ≤ βinit
(53)
5.1 Dual Encryption Scheme
We first describe the dual scheme of [Reg05]. This scheme was originally given in [GPV07], but the presentation
below is taken from Section 5.2.2 in [Pei15]. This scheme will eventually serve as the scheme AltHE in Definition
4.2.
Scheme 5.1 Dual Encryption Scheme [GPV07]
• Dual.KeyGen: Choose esk ∈ {0, 1}m uniformly at random. Using the procedure
GENTRAP(1n, 1m, q) from Theorem 3.5, sample a random trapdoor matrix A ∈ Zm×nq , together with the
trapdoor information tA. The secret key is sk = (−esk, 1) ∈ Zm+1q and the trapdoor is tA. The public key
is A′ ∈ Z(m+1)×nq , which is the matrix composed of A (the first m rows) and ATesk mod q (the last row).
• Dual.Encpk(µ): To encrypt a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, choose s ∈ Znq uniformly and create e ∈ Zm+1q by sampling
each entry from D
Zq,βinit . Output A
′
s+ e+ (0, . . . , 0, µ · q2) ∈ Zm+1q .
• Dual.Decsk(c): To decrypt, compute b′ = skT c ∈ Zq. Output 0 if b′ is closer to 0 than to q2 mod q,
otherwise output 1.
We make a few observations:
• For a ciphertext c with error e such that ‖e‖ < q
4
√
m+1
, the decryption procedure will operate correctly (since
sk
T
A
′ = 0).
• The trapdoor tA can be used to recover the randomness s, e from a ciphertext. To see this, note that the first
m entries of the ciphertext can be written as As + e′, where e′ ∈ Zmq . Therefore, the inversion algorithm
INVERT in Theorem 3.5 outputs s, e on input As + e′ and tA as long as ‖e′‖ < qCT√n log q for CT the
universal constant in Theorem 3.5.
• This scheme is naturally additively homomorphic; adding two ciphertexts encrypting µ0 and µ1 results in a
ciphertext encrypting µ0 ⊕ µ1.
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5.2 Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme from Dual
We can extend the scheme Dual into a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme DualHE in the same way
that the standard LWE scheme from [Reg05] is extended in [GSW13]. Namely, we map the ciphertexts to matrices
and encrypt the bit µ in a matrix (the key generation procedure remains the same). We begin with the required
preliminaries and then describe the scheme DualHE. Next, we prove a property of DualHE which is crucial for
quantum capability: the ciphertexts retain the same form throughout the computation. Finally, we show in Theorem
5.1 that for a strengthened version of the parameters in (53), DualHE a leveled fully homomorphic encryption
scheme.
To describe this scheme, we will require two operations used in [GSW13]. The first is the linear operator
G ∈ Z(m+1)×Nq (N = (m+ 1) log2 q), which converts a binary representation back to the original representation
in Zm+1q . More precisely, consider the N dimensional vector a = (a1,0, . . . , a1,l−1, . . . , am+1,0, . . . , am+1,l−1),
where l = log2 q. G performs the following mapping:
G(a) = (
log2 q−1∑
j=0
2j · a1,j , . . . ,
log2 q−1∑
j=0
2j · am+1,j) (54)
Observe that G is well defined even if a is not a 0/1 vector. We will call the non linear inverse operation G−1,
which converts a ∈ Zm+1q to its binary representation (a vector in ZN2 ). G−1 can also be applied to a matrix by
converting each column. Note that GG−1 is the identity operation. In terms of homomorphic evaluation, we will
only consider the NAND gate, since we are only concerned with applying Boolean circuits. The scheme can be
extended to arithmetic circuits over Zq, as described in further detail in [GSW13].
The description of the scheme given below is derived from talks ([Bra], [Wic]) describing the scheme in
[GSW13]. It is equivalent to the description given in [GSW13], but is more convenient for our purposes.
Scheme 5.2 DualHE: Classical Leveled FHE Scheme from Dual
• DualHE.KeyGen: This procedure is the same as Dual.KeyGen.
• DualHE.Encpk(µ): To encrypt a bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, choose S ∈ Zn×Nq uniformly at random and create E ∈
Z
(m+1)×N
q by sampling each entry from D
Zq ,βinit . Output A
′
S+E+ µG ∈ Z(m+1)×Nq .
• DualHE.Eval(C0,C1): To apply the NAND gate, on input C0,C1 output G−C0 ·G−1(C1).
For quantum capability, we will also require the following algorithm, which converts a ciphertext under DualHE
to a ciphertext under Dual:
• DualHE.Convert(C): Output column N of C
Given this algorithm, we can state decryption in terms of Dual4:
• DualHE.Decsk(C): Output Dual.Decsk(DualHE.Convert(C))
5.2.1 Ciphertext Form
We will rely on the fact that, throughout the computation of a Boolean circuit of depth L, a ciphertext encrypting a
bit µ can be written in the following form:
A
′
S+E+ µG (55)
4This is equivalent to the decryption algorithm of [GSW13], which is as follows. Let u = (0, . . . , 0, 1) ∈ Zm+1q . To decrypt, compute
b′ = skTCG−1( q
2
u). Output 0 if b′ is closer to 0 than to q
2
mod q, otherwise output 1.
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where ‖E‖∞ ≤ βinit(N + 1)L. This is clearly the structure of the ciphertext immediately after encryption and we
now show that this ciphertext structure is maintained after the NAND operation. The NAND operation is performed
by computing:
G−C0 ·G−1(C1) (56)
Assume the ciphertexts we begin with are Cb = A
′
Sb +Eb +µbG for b ∈ {0, 1}. Using the fact that GG−1 is the
identity operation, it is easy to see that the result of the NAND operation is:
A
′
S
′ +E′ + (1− µ0µ1)G (57)
for
S
′ = −S0 ·G−1(C1)− µ0S1 (58)
E
′ = −E0 ·G−1(C1)− µ0E1 (59)
Note that if both ‖E0‖∞ and ‖E1‖∞ are at most β, then ‖E′‖∞ ≤ β(N +1). It follows that if the scheme DualHE
is used to compute a circuit of depth L, ‖E‖∞ ≤ βinit(N + 1)L for all ciphertexts throughout the computation.
5.2.2 Encryption Conversion
We now use the above property to prove the correctness of DualHE.Convert. Assume we begin with a ciphertext
C = A′S + E + µG under DualHE. The ciphertext c (under Dual) will be column N of C. To see why this is
correct, first note that all individual columns of A′S+E are of the form A′s+ e. Second, observe that column N
of µG is equal to (0, . . . , 0, µ · q2).
5.2.3 Proof of Correctness and Security of Scheme 5.2
The above two sections allow us to easily prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 Let λ be the security parameter. There exists a function ηc which is logarithmic in λ such that
DualHE is IND-CPA secure and leveled fully homomorphic under the hardness assumption LWEn,q,D
Zq,βinit
if the
conditions in (53) as well as the following condition are satisfied:
βinit(N + 1)
ηc <
q
4(m+ 1)
. (60)
Proof: We prove that DualHE is IND-CPA secure by relying on the hardness of LWEn,m,q,D
Zq,βinit
(i.e. the
hardness of LWE with a superpolynomial noise ratio), which implies that the ciphertext is computationally indis-
tinguishable from a uniform string. We can use this LWE assumption as long as the public key A′ is statistically
indistinguishable from a uniformly random matrix (see Section 3.2). Since A is selected from a distribution which
is statistically indistinguishable from the uniform distribution and m = Ω(n log q), A′ is statistically indistinguish-
able from uniform due to the leftover hash lemma in [ILL89] (see [Reg05] or [Pei15] for more details).
We now show that DualHE is leveled fully homomorphic. From Section 5.2.1, it is clear that the evaluation
of the NAND operation is correct and that DualHE is compact. Let ηc be larger than the depth of the decryption
circuit of DualHE, which is logarithmic in λ. If we show that the decryption procedure operates correctly after
evaluation of a circuit of depth ηc, the standard bootstrapping technique
5 of [Gen09] can be used to turn DualHE
into a leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Due to Section 5.2.1, we can assume a ciphertext resulting
5A pure fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be obtained by assuming circular security. A leveled fully homomorphic encryption
scheme can be obtained by producing a string of public and secret keys and encrypting each secret key under the next public key - see
Section 4.1 of [Gen09].
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from a circuit of depth ηc can be written as A
′
S + E + µG, where ‖E‖∞ ≤ βinit(N + 1)ηc . It is easy to check
that the decryption procedure operates correctly as long as
‖E‖∞ <
q
4(m+ 1)
(61)
The condition in (61) is implied by the condition in (60).

5.3 Quantum Capability of DualHE
We now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2 Let λ be the security parameter, let ηc be the logarithmic function in Theorem 5.1, and let η be an
arbitrary logarithmic function in λ. Assume the choice of parameters satisfies the conditions in (53) as well as the
following condition:
βinit(N + 1)
η+ηc <
q
4(m+ 1)
. (62)
Under the hardness assumption of LWEn,q,D
Zq,βinit
, the scheme DualHE is quantum capable.
Observe that the only change in parameters involved in making DualHE quantum capable is increasing the circuit
depth by an additive logarithmic factor; this does not change the underlying computational assumption of the
hardness of learning with errors with a superpolynomial noise ratio.
Proof: To prove Theorem 5.2, we begin by noting that DualHE is leveled fully homomorphic by Theorem 5.1. We
now show that DualHE is quantum capable, by listing the requirements for quantum capability and proving that
each holds. The scheme corresponding to AltHE will be Dual (Section 5.1). Recall the definition of CDualHE from
Definition 4.1. For all ciphertexts c ∈ CDualHE:
1. There exists an algorithm DualHE.Convertpk which on input c produces an encryption ĉ under Dual, where
both c and ĉ encrypt the same value.
See Section 5.2.2.
2. Dual allows the XOR operation to be performed homomorphically. Moreover, the XOR operation is efficiently
invertible using only the public key of AltHE.
See Section 5.1.
3. There exists a distribution D which satisfies the following conditions:
(a) The Hellinger distance between the following two distributions is negligible in λ:
{Dual.Encpk(µ; r)|(µ, r) $←− D} (63)
and
{Dual.Encpk(µ; r)⊕H ĉ|(µ, r) $←− D} (64)
where ⊕H represents the homomorphic XOR operation.
Let
βf = βinit(N + 1)
ηc+η (65)
The distribution D will sample µ, s uniformly at random and will sample e from the discrete Gaussian
distribution D
Z
m+1
q ,βf
. Assume that ĉ = DualHE.Convert(c) = A′s′ + e′ + (0, . . . , 0, s · q2) where
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‖e′‖ ≤ βinit(N + 1)ηc
√
m+ 1. We can assume this since we know the format of the ciphertext
throughout the computation (see Section 5.2.1). The two distributions corresponding to (63) and (64)
are as follows:
{A′s+ e+ (0, . . . , 0, µ · q
2
)|(µ, s, e) $←− D} (66)
and
{A′(s+ s′) + e+ e′ + (0, . . . , 0, µ · q
2
)|(µ, s, e) $←− D} (67)
The Hellinger distance between the distributions in (66) and (67) is equal to the distance between the
following two distributions:
{e|e $←− D
Z
m+1
q ,βf
} (68)
and
{e+ e′|e $←− D
Z
m+1
q ,βf
} (69)
Since ‖e′‖ ≤ βinit(N + 1)ηc
√
m+ 1 and
βf
βinit(N+1)ηc
is equal to the superpolynomial function (N +
1)η, Lemma 3.3 shows that the distance between the two distributions is negligible.
(b) It is possible for a BQP server to create the following superposition:
∑
µ∈{0,1},r
√
D(µ, r) |µ, r〉 (70)
In this case, r = (s, e). D samples µ and s according to the uniform distribution and samples e
according to the discrete Gaussian distribution D
Z
m+1
q ,βf
. It is easy for a BQP server to create a
superposition over a discrete Gaussian (see Lemma 3.12 in [Reg05]6).
(c) Given y = AltHE.Encpk(µ0; r0) where (µ0, r0) is sampled from D, it must be possible to compute
µ0, r0 given the secret key and possibly additional trapdoor information (which can be computed as
part of the key generation procedure).
We first show that µ0, r0 can be recovered from y. Assume y has error e ∈ Zm+1q . Since e is sampled
from D
Z
m+1
q ,βf
, ‖e‖ ≤
√
m+ 1βf . Therefore, it is possible to compute µ0 as long as βf <
q
4(m+1)
(see Section 5.1). Second, it is possible to recover the randomness r0 of y as long as the lattice trapdoor
is applicable. As stated in Theorem 3.5, the lattice trapdoor is applicable if βf <
q
CT
√
n(m+1) log q
.
Combining these two conditions, we require that:
βf < min(
q
CT
√
n(m+ 1) log q
,
q
4(m+ 1)
) =
q
4(m+ 1)
(71)
The equality follows since m = Ω(n log q). Given the definition of βf in (65), this condition is satisfied
by (62).

6Taken from [BCM+18] - specifically, the state can be created using a technique by Grover and Rudolph ([GR02]), who show
that in order to create such a state, it suffices to have the ability to efficiently compute the sum
d∑
x=c
D
Zq ,BP (x) for any c, d ∈
{−⌊
√
BP ⌋, . . . , ⌈
√
BP ⌉} ⊆ Zq and to within good precision. This can be done using standard techniques used in sampling from the
normal distribution.
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6 Extension to Quantum Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption
We now present the construction of a quantum leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme from a quantum
capable classical leveled fully homomorphic encryption scheme, as described in Section 2.5. We first provide a
full description of the scheme (Section 6.1) and then proceed to proving that it is a quantum leveled FHE scheme.
Correctness of evaluation follows almost immediately from the correctness of the encrypted CNOT operation (see
Claim 4.3), while CPA security follows along the lines described in Section 2.5.
Assume there are L levels of the quantum circuit to be computed, where each level consists of Clifford gates,
followed by a layer of non intersecting Toffoli gates. Note that this circuit arrangement increases the depth of the
original circuit by a factor of at most 2. Let the depth of the classical circuit corresponding to each level of this
circuit be Lc (this includes decrypting and recovering randomness from ciphertexts corresponding to the encrypted
CNOT operations from the previous level, performing the Pauli key updates corresponding to the encrypted CNOT
operations from the previous level, and performing the Pauli key updates corresponding to the Clifford and Toffoli
gates of the current level). See Section 2.5 for a reminder of the above description.
The scheme is quite straightforward: the server initially receives a quantum standard basis state encrypted under
Pauli keys (which can be thought of as a one time padded classical string), along with the Pauli keys encrypted under
a quantum capable classical homomorphic encryption scheme (which we call HE) and a string of evaluation keys
(one for each level). Each evaluation key consists of the evaluation key of HE, encrypted secret key/ trapdoor
information and a fresh public key for each level. Recall that the evaluation key is of this form since we need to
use a fresh public/ secret key pair for each encrypted CNOT operation; this allows encryption of the secret key/
trapdoor of each level under a new, independent public key (see Section 2.5). The server then applies Toffoli and
Hadamard gates (which compose a universal gate set) as described in Section 2. Finally, the decryption consists
of the client first decrypting the encryptions of the Pauli keys, and then using the Pauli keys to decrypt the final
measurement result sent by the server.
Scheme 6.1 Quantum Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption Let HE be a classical leveled fully homomorphic
encryption scheme which is quantum capable for depth Lc.
• QHE.KeyGen(1λ, 1L):
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ L+ 1, let (pki, evki, ski, tski) =HE.Keygen(1λ, 1Lc ), where tski is the trapdoor informa-
tion required for randomness recovery from ciphertexts.
2. The public key pk is pk1 and the secret key sk is skL+1. The evaluation key evk consists of (evk1, . . . , evkL+1)
as well as (pki+1,HE.Encpki+1(ski), HE.Encpki+1(tski)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ L.
• QHE.Encpk(m): For a message m ∈ {0, 1}λ, the encryption is (ZzXx |m〉 ,HE.Encpk1(z, x))7, where
z, x ∈ {0, 1}λ are chosen at random. Note that ZzXx |m〉 can be represented as the classical string x⊕m.
• QHE.Decsk: The input is a classical message m ∈ {0, 1}λ and encryptions of z, x ∈ {0, 1}λ under pkL+1.
The encryptions are first decrypted using skL+1 to obtain z, x. The decrypted message is Z
zXx |m〉, which
can be represented as x⊕m.
• QHE.Eval: Clifford gates and Toffoli gates are applied to an encrypted state as follows:
1. To apply a Clifford gate, the Clifford is applied to the Pauli one time padded input state and the en-
crypted Pauli keys are homomorphically updated according to which Clifford gate was applied.
2. To apply a Toffoli gate:
7Observe that this encryption can immediately be extended to quantum states by replacing m with a λ qubit state |ψ〉. The decryption
can also be extended in the same manner.
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(a) The Toffoli gate is applied to the Pauli one time padded state. Assume the Toffoli is applied on top
of the Pauli one time pad ZzXx ∈ P3.
(b) The Pauli key encryptions are homomorphically updated according to Pzx.
(c) Three encrypted CNOT operations are used to correct Czx (see Section 3.3.2 for details on Czx
and Pzx). As part of each operation, the Pauli key encryptions are homomorphically updated (see
Claim 6.3 for a full description of how this is done).
6.1 CPA Security
In this section, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1 The scheme presented in Section 6.1 is IND-CPA secure.
Proof: To prove CPA security as defined in Definition 3.10, we show that for any polynomial time adversary A,
there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that
AdvCPA[A] = |Pr[A(pk, evk,QHE.Encpk(0)) = 1]− Pr[A(pk, evk,QHE.Encpk(1)) = 1]| = µ(λ) (72)
where (pk, evk, sk) ← QHE.Keygen(1λ).
The only difficulty in proving (72) is that encryptions of sk1 and tsk1 are also given to the attacker as part of the
evaluation key; we need to prove that this information can be replaced with encryptions of 0. This can be done via
standard techniques in proving security of leveled homomorphic encryption schemes (see Section 4.1 in [Gen09]).
We include the proof for completeness.
We proceed through L hybrids. In the final hybrid, the attacker is given only the public key pk1 and the
evaluation key evk′ = (evk1, pk2, evk2, . . . , pkL+1, evkL+1) (along with many encryptions of 0). CPA security
at this point follows immediately (by replacing the encryptions of z, x with 0 and then using Lemma 2.1). The
hybrids are as follows:
HybL+1: The evaluation key is as described in Section 6.1.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ L, where i is decreasing:
Hybi: The evaluation key is the same as in Hybi+1, except HE.Encpki+1(tski) and HE.Encpki+1(ski) are
replaced with encryptions of 0.
Note that in Hybi, the evaluation key does not contain secret key or trapdoor information corresponding to public
keys pki, . . . , pkL+1. More specifically, the evaluation key in Hyb1 is evk
′ (all the encryptions of secret keys and
trapdoors have been replaced by encryptions of 0).
First, HybL+1 is computationally indistinguishable from HybL due to the CPA security of HE under pkL+1
(note that encryptions of skL+1 and tskL+1 were not provided as part of the evaluation key). For all 1 ≤ i ≤ L− 1,
Hybi+1 is indistinguishable from Hybi due to the CPA security of HE under pki+1. This is because Hybi+1 has no
secret key or trapdoor information corresponding to pki+1.
It follows that there exists a negligible function µC such that the CPA security of QHE
|Pr[A(pk, evk,QHE.Encpk(0)) = 1]− Pr[A(pk, evk,QHE.Encpk(1)) = 1]| (73)
can be upper bounded as follows:
· · · ≤ µCL+ |Pr[A(pk, evk′,QHE.Encpk(0)) = 1]− Pr[A(pk, evk′,QHE.Encpk(1)) = 1]|
≤ µC(L+ 1) (74)
where (pk, evk, sk) ← QHE.Keygen(1λ) and evk′ = (evk1, pk2, evk2, . . . , pkL+1, evkL+1).

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6.2 Quantum Leveled FHE
In this section, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.2 The scheme QHE presented in Section 6.1 is a quantum leveled fully homomorphic encryption
scheme.
Combining Theorem 6.2 with Theorem 5.2 provides the main result of this paper (stated informally in Theorem
1.1). To prove Theorem 6.2, we need to prove that QHE can evaluate depth L quantum circuits. This is taken care
of by the following claim:
Claim 6.3 Assume the underlying classical encryption scheme HE of QHE is quantum capable for depth Lc. Then
there exist z′, x′ ∈ {0, 1}2 such that a BQP machine with access to a ciphertext c encrypting s under pki, a
quantum state ZzXx |ψ〉 on two qubits, ciphertexts encrypting z, x under pki, and the evaluation key of QHE can
compute a state within negligible trace distance of the following ideal state
CNOT s1,2Z
z′Xx
′ |ψ〉 〈ψ| (Zz′Xx′)†(CNOT s1,2)† (75)
as well as the encryptions of z′, x′ under pki+1.
Proof: Let cz,x,pki be the concatenation of four ciphertexts, each encrypting a single bit of z, x under pki. The
server applies the following operations:
1. As described in Section 2.2, the server applies the encrypted CNOT operation to the two qubit state ZzXx |ψ〉
using the ciphertext ĉ =HE.Convert(c). According to Claim 4.3, the server will obtain a ciphertext y =AltHE.Encpk(µ0, r0),
a string d ∈ {0, 1}m and a state within negligible trace distance of the following ideal state:
(Zd·((µ0,r0)⊕(µ1,r1)) ⊗Xµ0)CNOTs1,2 |ψ〉 (76)
where AltHE.Encpk(µ0; r0) = AltHE.Encpk(µ1; r1)⊕H ĉ and ⊕H is the homomorphic XOR operation.
2. The server uses pki+1 to compute HE.Encpki+1(cz,x,pki) and HE.Encpki+1(ĉ, y, d).
3. The server computes the encryption of z, x under pki+1 by homomorphically running the decryption circuit
on inputs HE.Encpki+1(ski) and HE.Encpki+1(cz,x,pki) .
4. The server homomorphically computes (µ0, r0) and (µ1, r1), using the ciphertexts encrypting tski, ski, ĉ, y, d
(all encrypted with HE under public key pki+1). The server then uses this result, along with the ciphertexts
encrypting z, x, d, to homomorphically compute z′ = z+ (d · ((µ0, r0)⊕ (µ1, r1)), 0) and x′ = x+ (0, µ0).
The result of this computation is the encryption of z′, x′ with HE under pki+1.

Theorem 6.2 follows from Theorem 6.1 and Claim 6.3:
Proof of Theorem 6.2: Theorem 6.1 shows QHE is IND-CPA secure. From the description of the scheme
(Scheme 6.1), it is clear that QHE is compact. Since the number of Toffoli gates is polynomial in λ, Claim 6.3
(along with the triangle inequality) implies that the trace distance of the server’s final state from the ideal (correct)
final state is at most negligible in λ.

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